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SHALL THE EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT
REPLACE THE TREATY?
EDWIN BORCHARDt
IN recent years many political leaders and publicists have sought to
prove that the treaty-making process, requiring the approval of two-thirds
of the Senate, has become too cumbersome, inefficient, and "undemo-
cratic." Because of well established "usage," they claim, it has become
valid and desirable to substitute for the treaty the executive agreement,
preferably without congressional approval or, if necessary, with approval
by a majority of Congress.' Advocates of the change point out that some
1300 executive agreements have been concluded during our national his-
tory, as contrasted with some 900 treaties. It i8 not mentioned, however,
that up to 1928 only 15 treaties had been rejected by the Senate, usually
for good reasons; that 47 were not acted upon; and that while some 160
treaties have been amended by the Senate,2 in most cases the changes have
benefited the nation.
BASES OF THE PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
The recent proposals for a change in the Constitution, either with or
without benefit of a constitutional amendment, have their origin in several
grievances and are said to derive moral support from several recent deci-
sions of the Supreme Court. The modern "reform" movement may be
said to have begun with Secretary Hay's denunciation of the Senate for
substituting the word "treaty" for the words "special agreement" in the
projected arbitration treaties of 1904.8 The movement received particular
impetus from, and finds its chief present source in, the belief that the two-
thirds rule prevented American ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, and
thus, to use President Wilson's phrase, "broke the heart of the world."
f Justus S. Hotchkiss Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. See McCLuRE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEmaENTS (1941) 363, He makes
the concession, intended to be generous, that unimportant, non-controversial matters may
still be left to treaty and Senate "ratification," but that important and controversial
matters become the subject of executive agreement. Id. at 378. Senator Taft remarked in
the debate on the Panama Resolution, December 3, 1942, that "As a matter of fact, no
treaties of any importance have been submitted to the Senate since I have been a Member
of the body." 88 CONG. Rac. 9276 (1942).
2. See DANGERFIELD, IN DEFENSE OF THE SENATE: A STUDY Ix TPEATY MmlUNG
(1933) 256. While only 1.8 per cent of the treaties considered were actually rejected by
the Senate, such figures are not conclusive, since these treaties differed in importance.
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But this argument is self-defeating, since, as recent admissions of the un-
workability and impropriety of the Treaty of Versailles demonstrate, the
Treaty deserved defeat because it was not a treaty of peace but a declara-
tion of war.4 Even at the time, informed students realized that it was likely
to prove a charter for the production of conflict and war. It must be ad-
mitted, however, that only a few Senators, such as the late Robert M.
La Follette of Wisconsin, placed their opposition to the Treaty on this
ground. Nor was ratification thwarted, as it might well have been, because
Articles X and XVI of the Covenant purported to commit the United States
to a "blank check" diplomacy, creating an obligation to go to war if neces-
sary in order to maintain the status quo of 1919. The real cause of the
Treaty's defeat was that President Wilson requested Democratic Sena-
tors not to accept the Lodge reservations, which, it may be added, were
acceptable to the British and many students of the subject.
The apprehensions of recent opponents of the two-thirds rule have been
aroused by the belief that retention of the rule might prevent the associa-
tion of the United States with a projected international organization," of a
character still unknown. An effort was made to preserve the Senate preroga-
tive in the Connally Resolution,7 which insisted that "constitutional proc-
esses" be observed by the United States in joining any peace organization
and further provided that any treaty designed to produce international co-
operation require approval of two-thirds of the Senate. The counter-
attack has been vigorous. Professor Corwin has interpreted the term "con-
4. See Bullitt, The Tragedy of Versailles, Life, March 27, 1944, p. 99. NV. D.
Herridge former Canadian Minister to the United Statc,, said that: "Versailles
was not a treaty of peace but a declaration of var." Hmantpm WincH K Dn oF REvOLU-
TioN? (1943) 23. See also the late Senator Robert M. La Follette's contemporary char-
acterization of the "peacemakers" of Versailles as "war makers:' Reprinted in The
Progressive, June 26, 1944, p. 1, col. 3; and Mrs. Clare Booth Luce's statement: "This
war began at Versailles..." N. Y. Times, June 25, 1944, § 1, p. 23, col. 5.
5. See Thomas Lamont's letter to the Editor of the New York Times: "It vas upon
the Administration's insistence that the Democratic Senators voted against acceptance of
the Covenant with reservations and thereby automatically voted to defeat the treaty." N. Y.
Times, April 23, 1944, § 4, p. 8, col. 6. See Earl Grey's letter to the London Tin'es,
which was endorsed by the British and French press, reprinted in N. Y. Times, Feb. 1,
1920, p. 1, col. 8; FLEIXING, TE UNITED STATES AND THE LAGU OF NATIoNs (1932)
311-13. See also BoNsAi., UzmrNsHan BUsiESs (1944) 278. For a statement of tha
negligible part played by the two-thirds rule in the defeat of treaties, see McClendon, The
Two-Thirds Rule in Senate Action Upon Trcaties, 1799-1901 (1932) 26 Am. J. IrT. L
37, 55.
6. See CoLErovE, THE AmTERIcAN SENATE AND WVoIn PnAcz (1944); Comn:,
TE CONsTIT=ON AND WORLD ORGANIZATION (1944) 31 ct seq.
7. SEr. REs. No. 192,89 CONG. R., Nov. 5, 1943, at 9329; Colw., oP' cit. msvra note
6, at 51-52. See also the plank on foreign affairs of the Republican Party platform, June 27,
1944, which took the precaution of insisting on Senate consent not only for a "treaty" but
also for an "agreement." N. Y. Times, June 28, 1944, p. 1, col. 2-3.
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stitutional processes" in the Connally Resolution as being "non-committal"
and has observed that the reference to "any treaty" merely means that if a
treaty is made, the Senate will of course have to approve it.8 More recently,
Congressman Bloom, the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
of the House of Representatives, has argued that the House should be
given a coordinate share with the Senate in the "ratification" of treaties
by mere majority vote. In dismissing the historical fact that the proposal
of James Wilson to this effect was defeated in the Constitutional Conven-
tion of 1787, by ten votes to one,' ° Mr. Bloom alleges that the reasons11
for excluding the House have become obsolete and that a more democratic
method of treaty approval is now necessary.
Some of the original objections to House participation in the treaty-
making process-the necessity for secrecy and speed, the short term of
House members, the fluctuating membership-were, as Congresxnan
Bloom urges in his pamphlet, probably valid only so long as the Senate
was considered to be an executive council which shared in the actual negotia-
tion of treaties. The fact that the Senate is now merely asked to give "con-
sent" by the constitutional two-thirds vote to treaties pieviously negotiated
by the executive-a fait accompli-does not by itself invalidate the tradi-
tional doctrine. At least one of the other reasons originally underlying the
two-thirds requirement-the desire of the small states to prevent imposition
of treaties by a mere majority-retains its cogency. It is well known that
some delegates in the ratifying conventions thought the two-thirds require-
ment too small, rather than too large a prote'tion. More important than
the historical reasons, in justifying continuation of decisive Senate con-
trol, is perhaps the need for counteracting the recent unprecedented infla-
8. See CORWIN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 52. Mr. Corwin objected to the saving clause
"or agreement" in the Republican Party platform. N. Y. Times, June 30, 1944, p. 20, col. 6.
9. BLOOM, TREATY-MAKING PowER: FOURTEEN POINTS SHOWING WHY THE TREATY-
MAKING POWER SHOULD BE SHARED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1944).
10. See 2 FARRAxD, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL COvENoTio (1937) 538; CORWIN,
op. cit. supra note 6, at 33. Mr. Corwin states: "Not until September 7 (1787), ten
days before its final adjournment, did the Convention adopt the existing provision [allowing
participation by the President] incidentally rejecting by a vote of ten States to one a
proposal by Wilson of Pennsylvania that treaties should be made by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Representatives," Id. at 32. See also
the rejection of Wilson's proposal, Sept. 8, 1787, by a vote of nine to one, with one divided.
2 FARRAND, op. cit. supra at 548. Various other proposals, to permit a majority alone to
concur, to count in all the Senators and to exempt treaties of peace from the two-thirds
rule or Presidential consideration, were formally voted down. Id. at 540 et seq.
11. Summarized in HOLT, TREATIES DEmEATED BY THE SENATE (1933) 7. George
Washington denied the right of the House to be joined in the making of treaties; see
his communications to the Senate in 1790 and 1792. SEN. Doc. No. 9, 67th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1931).
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tion of executive power. A treat), should be convincing enough to com-
mand a two-third vote.' 2
Instead of changing the traditional practice so as to permit the House
to share in the "ratifying" process, consideration should be given to the
desirability of a more fundamental revision of the treaty-making power,
including wider consultation in the actual making of treaties."3
HISTORICAL DIFFERENCES
The Constitution refers only to treaties, giving to them legal effect as
the supreme law of the land, and says nothing about Presidential execu-
tive agreements. Yet it is apparent that, in dealing with the powers of
the states, the Founders were cognizant of the distinction between treaties
-which states were prohibited from making-and mere "agreements" or
"compacts" with other states or foreign powers," which they were per-
mitted to conclude, provided they obtained the consent of Congress. 2i
12. The New York Herald Tribune made the following answer to Professor Corvin's
statement that the two-thirds rule has become an "anachronism":
"But if the administration is thinking along these lines it would do well to
realize that the point is largely academic. If Congress and the country should
overwhelmingly favor a treaty, it is unlikely that an obstructive Senate minority
would persist. The Senate's real power in treaty making is not merely a mechani-
cal one; it resides in the Senate's ability to force public debate, awake doubts
and secure popular support for other courses than those proposed by the E_-cu-
tive. This power is anything but anachronistic, nor is it easily waved saide by
juggling precedents or calling treaties by some other name." N. Y. Herald
Tribune, April 17, 1944, p. 14, col. 1.
See also MATHEWS, A~mIcAN FOREIG, RELATIONS: Cormucr AiuD PoLicms
(1938) 545-46:
"Frequent resort to executive agreements is undoubtedly open to objection. In
contrast with treaties, such agreements may be entered into secretly; and the
dictates of practical expediency may sometimes afford a plausible e'cuse for
maintaining secrecy where a more far-sighted policy would avoid it. As a rule,
international agreements, as well as treaties, should be entered into only in such
a way that the salutary influence of public opinion can be brought to bear upon
them; the country should not, as a rule, be bound by the stipulations of exccu-
tive agreements without its knowledge and without opportunity to protest."
13. See the proposals of ex-Ambassador Gibson in his address at Haverford College.
N. Y. Times, June 4, 1944, § 1, p. 25, col. 1-2. See also Gmvso:, TuE RoA 'o Foro:;
Pouicy (1944), 179-81. See the pre-war French method of legislative participation in treaty
negotiations. Borchard, Democracy in Foreign Policy. Bronson Cutting Lecture, 83 Co;c.
REc. (app.) 538, 541 (1938).
14. See U. S. CoNsr. ArT. I, § 10: "No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or
confederation... No state shall, without the consent of Congress... enter into any agree-
ment or compact with another state, or with a foreign power... " In addition, the word
"treaties" is referred to in three separate Articles: concerning negotiations of the national
government, id., ART. II, §2; the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary, id., Arm. II, §2;
and the supremacy of treaties as the law of the land, id., A='. VI.
15. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U. S. 503, 519 (1S33).
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That the Founders were well aware of this distinction has been further
demonstrated by Mr. A. C. Weinfeld,1" who has convincingly shown that
the framers of both the Articles of Confederation of 1777 and the Con-
stitution of 1787 were under the influence of the great Swiss natural-law
jurist and positivist, Emmerich de VattelY' In his classic work, Le Droit
des Gens, Vattel made the following distinctions :
"Section 152. Treaties of Alliance and other public treaties .....
A treaty, in Latin foedus, is a pact entered into by sovereigns for
the welfare of the State, either in perpetuity or for a considerable
length of time.
Section 153. Compacts, agreements or conventions. Pacts which
have for their object matters of temporary interest are called agree-
ments, conventions, compacts. They are fulfilled by a single act and
not by a continuous performance of acts. When the act in question
is performed these pacts are executed once for all; whereas treaties
are executory in character and the acts called for must continue
as long as the treaty exists.
Section 192. Treaties executed by an act done once for all. Treaties
which do not call for continuous acts, but are fulfilled by a single act,
and are thus executed once for all, those treaties, unless indeed we
prefer to give them another name (see Sec. 153), those conventions,
those pacts which are executed by an act done once for all and not
by successive acts, are, when once carried out, fully and definitely
consummated. If valid, they naturally bring about a permanent and
irrevocable state of things ..... " 18
Vattel thus distinguished between agreements embracing continuous execu-
tory obligations of projected future duration, which he considered the
proper subject of treaties, and pacts having for their object matters of
temporary interest or a single act. The latter he considered, though some-
what ambiguously, the appropriate subject of "compacts, agreements or
conventions." It is further apparent that Vattel believed that many per-
manent transactions-such as a cession of territory or peace agreement-
should be accomplished by treaty even though consummated by a single
act. Mr. Levitan "9 agrees with Mr. Weinfeld that the term "agreement
16. Weinfeld, What Did the Framers of the Federal Constitution Al can by "'Agree-
ments or Compacts"? (1936) 3 U. OF CHI. Rav. 453.
17. VATEL, LE DROIT DES GENS OU pRINCIPES DE LA LOI NATURELL_.
18. See Weinfeld, supra note 16, at 459-60. In a footnote to this quotation Mr. Win-
feld stated:
"The translation is that accompanying the edition of the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace except that the word 'pacte' I translate as 'pact', 'paciion'
as 'compact', whereas in that translation 'pacte' is 'compact', 'paction' is 'arrange-
ment'. My translation is equally correct and it brings out more clearly the rela-
tionship between Vattel's ideas and the language of the constitutional provi-
sions." Id. at 460, n. 30.
19. See Levitan, Executive Agreements: A Study of the Executive in the Control of
the Foreign Relations of the United States (1940) 35 ILL. L. REv. 365, 369.
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or compact" referred to in the Constitution of the United States is de-
rived from the "agreement, convention, compact", or the original French
"accords, conventions, pactions," discussed by Vattel.
The "Founding Fathers" formulated this distinction in terms of "im-
portant" matters,' which were to be the subject only of formal federal
20. " ... The founding fathers felt that the matter of assuming obligations or malng
promises to do something in the future for foreign nations was of sufficient importance to
require that the proposal have the support of two-thirds of the Senators... " Senator
Robert Taft in the debate on the Panama Joint Resolution, 83 CoNo. REc. 9276 (1942).
With the exception of changes indicated in the above excerpt from Weinfeld's article,
the quotations from Vattel appear in VArmE., THE LAw OF NATIONS OR THE PnrINcIPUZs 0
NATuRAL LAW (Carnegie Endowment, ed. 1916), §§ 152, 153, 192.
A distinction along such lines between treaties and other agreements may be found
elsewhere. The Oxford Dictionary states:
"Treaty ... A contract between, two or more states, relating to peace, truce,
alliance, commerce, or other international relation.... : In the language of modern
diplomacy the term "treaty" is restricted to the more important international agree-
ments, especially to those which are the work of a congress, while agreements
dealing with subordinate questions are described by the more general term "con-
vention." ... OxFoRn DIcIoNARy (1926). While not especially informative, this
quotation indicates a distinction between important and subordinate matters:'
Burdick, The Treaty Making Power (1931-32), 10 FoR. ArrAirs 265, 279 speaks of a
treaty as embracing "a matter of important mutual, and therefore of international concern,
and no executive officer will care to submit to the Senate for its critical consideration a
treaty which has not real international significance." COWM, THE PnESrszNfs COMOL
OF FoREIGN RELATIONS (1917) 125, distinguishes between a "durable" treaty and the
President's "temporary" power by way of executive agreement. AinmAL. Dicsr or Purmc
INTERNATIo-.AL LAw CASEs 1919-22, Case No. 225, Paris Agreement Case, distinguishes
between the "solemn form of treaties" and "informal agreements." See 5 HAcMnonrrm,
DIGEST OF INTRRNATIONAL LAW (1943) 397. Assistant Secretary F. B. Sayre in The Cor.-
stitutionality of the Trade Agreements Act (1939) 39 COL. L. REv. 751, 755, says:
"International agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and
those involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the
form of treaties. But international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying
out well-established national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements
of a more or less temporary nature usually take the form of executive agreements.'
But even in the matter of exempting certain Canadian and United States vessels in shel-
tered waters on the West Coast from the requirements of the Load Line Convention,
when an executive agreement was suggested, Undersecretary Castle stated that the exemp-
tion "could not be effected on the part of the United States by an E-ecutive Agree-
ment." 5 HAcEWoRTH, op. cit. stipra, at 400.
Undersecretary Grew is quoted as writing in 1926 a note stating that, in addition to
the treaty power, "the Executive is empowered without legislative sanction to concluace
with foreign governments certain classes of agreements which are not classified as
treaties in the sense in which that term is used in the Constitution. These agreements
are concluded by virtue of the authority inherent in the Chief Executive under the Con-
stitution, and are confined to subject-matter within the purview of his constitutional
authority." Id. at 402. See 1 BLAcKsroNE, CommETrAmxs (Tucker ed. 1S03) (app.) 310:
"The former (treaties) relate ordinarily to subjects of great national magnitude and im-
portance, and are often perpetual, or made for a considerable period of time.... " Chief
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treaties-known to the Founders as "treaties of peace, of amity and com-
merce, consular conventions, treaties of navigation" 21-and "routine"
or unimportant questions,2 which the States were left free to conclude
between theimelves by mere agreements.
Circumstances have forced the Executive, in the conduct of military
affairs and certain aspects of foreign relations, to conclude-either with
or without congressional authorization-numerous agreements with for-
eign countries covering the movement of armed forces, the adjustment of
claims, protocols, tariff and postal agreements, modi vivendi and, as in
1898,'1918, and 1943, even armistices. The different types of executive
agreements will be discussed later. It suffices here to point out that agree-
ments in the past have dealt either with routine questions, within the
President's admitted constitutional powers, or have related to matters
which the Senate deemed too unimportant for formal treaty procedure, or
which Congress had previously authorized. Where the executive agree-
ments perchance related to important questions, as in the case of the famous
"Gentlemen's Agreement" of 1907 or the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of
1917-both with Japan-the Senate acquiesced in the conclusion that its
approval was not required or would not be insisted upon.
Both writers and courts have made a similar distinction between
formal agreements rising to the dignity of treaties and informal agree-
ments of mere administrative character, which are appropriately the sub-
ject of executive agreement.' Even ex-Supreme Court Justice and ex-
Senator Sutherland, whose dicta in the Curtiss-Wright 
24 and Belmont 26
Justice Taney in the famous case of Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540, 572 (U. S. 1840),
recognized a fundamental distinction between "treaties" and "agreements," citing Vattel
in support. See Baldwin, The Entry of the United States into World Polities as Ot of the
Great P~wers (1901) 9 Y=I.E Rxv. 399, 414. Simeon E. Baldwin speaks of an executive
agreement as a "bargain ... something less than a treaty." On the distinction as related
to subject-matter, see SEr. Doc. No. 244, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., by Henry S. Fraser.
21. Weinfeld, supra note 16, at 460.
22. Moore, Treaties and Executive Agreements (1905) 20 Poi- Scl. Q. 385, 389.
23. Form plays an important part, among other matters, in determining what is a
treaty. Professor Garner, Reporter of the Harvard Research Draft on Treaties, makes
form the criterion of the treaty and the subject of the rules proposed. The Draft states
"There is no treaty apart from the instrument which records its stipulations." (1935)
29 Ams. J. INT. L. (Supp) 691. See also 5 HACKWORTH1, op. cit. supra note 20, at 397.
See McCLuRE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 343; Four Packages of Cut Diamonds v. United States,
256 Fed. 305, 306 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919) : "Such conventions (postal) are not treaties, because
not made by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and they are not laws, because not
enacted by Congress." See the denial of the McClure doctrine that the executive agreement
is omnipotent, by Senators Connally, Taft and others. 88 CONG. REC. 9270, 9276 et seq.
(1942). In respect to form it may also be questioned whether the multi-articled agreement
with Canada effected by exchange of notes August 18, 1939, as revised later, providing
for reciprocal air transportation service, should not have been incorporated in a treaty.
See SCHNAPPER, UNITED NATIONS AGR. IENTS (1944) 149 et seq.
24. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304 .(1936).
25. United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324 (1937).
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cases gave moral support to the new cult which attributes the force of a
treaty to an executive agreement, spoke of a protocol as an example of an
executive agreement, "without the formality of a treaty and constituting
only a moral obligation.
'26
While it is true, as Justice Sutherland said, that the precise dividing line
between the subject-matter of treaties and executive agreements has never
been authoritatively determined, the precedents indicate, as he says, that
"international agreements which are not treaties in the full constitutional
sense, are perhaps confined to such as affect administrative matters, as dis-
tinguished from policies, and those which are of only individual concern,
or limited scope and duration, as distinguished from those of general con-
sequence and permanent character." 2' This traditional distinction in sub-
stance, form, and procedure between treaties and executive agreements
affords no justification for a belief in their interchangeability.
An executive agreement comes into force on signature, and requires no
concurring legislation. If it could repeal acts of Congress, like a treaty,
acts of Congress would have a precarious existence. Whatever justifica-
tion there may be for the executive agreement within its proper scope or
for congressional legislation within the authority of Congress, there is no
constitutional warrant whatever for the suggestion that the President has
an option to submit his compact either to the Senate as a treaty, like the
recent petroleum agreement with Great Britain,-a 'or to the Congress for
majority approval. The argument for "democracy" is equally invalid. All
constitutions require for important acts a decisive majority. Impeachment
requires two-thirds of the Senate, and ratification of constitutional Amend-
ments, three-quarters of the states. We hang capital offenders only by a
unanimous vote of a jury.
TYPEs oF EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
There are two major classes of executive agreements: (1) those au-
thorized by Congress, and (2) those negotiated by the President on his .wn
responsibility. By far the greater number fall within the former class.
Agreements Authoriced by Congress. Perhaps the largest sub-group
in this general category are the several hundred postal agreements and the
various reciprocal trade agreements under the Tariff Acts of 1890 and
1897 and the Act of June 12, 1934, and its successors.
The extensive delegation of power under the 1934 Tariff Act
presents a serious constitutional question. No conclusive answer is
provided by the various cases in which the Supreme Court has sustained
the delegation under prior tariff acts of the lesser power to determine con-
clusively whether facts existed to justify imposition of increased or de-
creased schedules because of "dumping," discriminatory practices by
26. Suzar.Aim, CosTrrunoAL POWER AND WORsoD ArFAms (1919) 120.
27. Id. at 121.
27a. N. Y. Times, August 9,1944.
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foreign countries against American exporters, or currency manipulation.2 1
The power delegated under the 1934 Act and its successors is so much
more far-reaching that its validity has necessarily been challenged. 0 How-
ever, it is doubtful whether the constitutional question thus posed can be
presented to the courts in a justiciable "case or controversy."
Numerous other Acts of Congress have authorized the President, upon
finding that a given state of affairs existed, to issue a proclamation carry-
ing into effect all or part of the substantive provisions of the legislation in
question. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,0 the ques-
tion was presented whether Congress had acted unconstitutionally in dele-
gating to the President the authority to impose a congressionally authorized
embargo on arman-ent shipments to Paraguay and Bolivia, during the
Chaco controversy, if he became convinced such action would promote
peace between the two countries. The District Court ruled that this con-
stituted an improper delegation of power; the Supreme, Court reversed
unanimously. Mr. Justice Sutherland's 6pinion, however, contained a
lengthy and uncalled for disquisition on the powers of the federal Gov-
ernment and the executive in foreign relations."1
At times Congress has authorized the President to enter into agree.
ments with foreign countries, while reserving to itself the ultimate power
to approve or disapprove the agreement actually reached. A good example
is the Debt-Funding Agreement Act of February 9, 1922.
Perhaps the most extensive recent delegation of power in this field was
that embodied in the Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941,82 authorizing
the President to enter into mutual aid agreements with foreign countries.
Under the aegis of this Act, the United States has to date sent abroad
over twenty-five billion dollars of American materials.
Although the important American territorial acquisitions of 1803, 1819,
1848, 1853, 1867 and 1898 were accomplished by formal treaties, terri-
28. Hampton v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 (1928) ; Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649
(1892).
29. See Fraser, The Constitutionality of the Trade Agreements Act of 1934 (1937)
31 PRoc. Am. Soc. INT. LAw 55. The following articles support constitutionality: Hack-
worth, Legal Aspects of the Trade Agreements Act of 1934 (1935) 21 A. B. A. J. 570;
Sayre, The Constitutionality of the Trade Agreements Act (1939) 39 COL. L. Rv. 751.
30. 299 U. S. 304 (1936).
31. See page 680 infra.
32. Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941, 55 STAT. 31 (1941), 22 U. S. C., § 411 (Supp.
1941-43). The House voted on March 22, 1944, to join the UNRRA. A day later the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, in voting to extend the Lend-Lease Act to June 30, 1945,
voted unanimously for the Wadsworth Amendment to prohibit the President from making
post-war economic or military commitments to any nations in the final Lend-Lease settle-
ments "except in accordance with established constitutional procedure." 90 Cong. Rec.,
May 4, 1944, at 4080. The Senate struck out the phrase "in any final settlement," 90
Cong. Rec., May 8, 1944, at 4177 et seq., and the House agreed, 90 Cong. Rec., May 12,
1944, at 4514:
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tory has under special circumstances been acquired by mere act of Con-
gress. Thus, the annexations of Texas in 1845 and of Hawaii in 1898 were
accomplished by joint resolutions of both Houses; in the former case,
after a treaty was rejected because Mexico threatened to regard it as a
cause for war. In neither case was the act of Congress preceded by an
executive agreement; in neither case was the annexation outside the povers
of Congress."3
Another precedent is found by some writers .1 in the Joint Resolution of
Congress of June 19, 1934, authorizing the President "to accept mem-
bership in the International Labor Organization." An invitation was
promptly extended to the United States by the organization and was accepted
on August 20, 1934, through a letter addressed to it by the American
Consul at Geneva. But whatever the obligations thus contracted, which are
mainly trivial, the method affords no analogy for the general replacement
of treaties by executive agreements, since adherence to the International
Labor Organization had previously been authorized by Congress, with the
unanimous approval of the Senate.
It is also not without interest to note that when Representative Lewis of
Maryland, after the so-called World Court protocol failed to receive a
two-thirds vote in the Senate in January, 1935, introduced a bill authoriz-
ing the President to adhere to the Court protocols, the bill was not seriously
supported and remained in committee. A similar fate overtook a joint reso-
lution introduced by Senator Pope on May 7, 1935, to enable the United
States to accept membership in the League of Nations.35
Agreements Not Authorized by Congress. By virtue of his office as the
diplomatic representative of the United States, the President, on numer-
ous occasions, has been obliged to enter into many types of agreements
of a less formal character than treaties. As Commander-in-Chief of the
Army and Navy, the President has also found it necessary or advisable to
send military forces into foreign countries to protect American citizens
and has, on his own initiative, entered into armistices and other military
protocols and arrangements. The daily work of the Department of State
also requires the consummation of numerous understandings and arrange-
ments, variously described as declarations, protocols, exchange of notes,
aide-memoire, acts and modi vivendi.
History provides numerous examples of the use of the Presidential
prerogative through executive agreements with foreign governments. Thus,
various Presidents have adjusted claims against foreign states or sub-
mitted them to arbitration and entered into modi vivendi provisionally
settling questions whose permanent regulation was left for subsequent
33. See CRAxuAL, TnEATi --TEm-R MAKING AND EnnroncmNT (2d ed. 1916) § 67.
34. Gamer, Acts and oint Resolutions of Congress as Subsitutes for Treatics (1935)
29 Am J. IxT. L. 482, 484.
35. Id. at 485.
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treaties, as in the Santo Domingo case of 1905, and the fisheries adjust-
ment after 1885. In his military capacity as Commander-in-Chief, Presi-
dent McKinley entered into the important Protocol of August 12, 1898,
with the French Ambassador, establishing the bases of conditions for peace
with Spain-an armistice agreement whose terms were made definitive
by the formal Treaty of December 5, 1898. In his capacity as Commander-
in-Chief, President Monroe in 1817 signed the Rush-Bagot Agreement-
later amended-limiting armaments on the Great Lakes; however, being
doubtful of his power, Monroe in 1818 submitted this Agreement to the
Senate for approval.8 6,
Agreements benefiting the United States or agreements settling issues
without obligating the country, especially if of minor importance, rarely
evoke challenge. It is only agreements of a more important character,
involving future commitments, that encroach upon the treaty-making
power of the Senate. If a substantial opinion in the Senate demands sub-
nr ssion of an agreement for approval as a treaty, no President should
resolve the doubt in his own favor and defy the Senate and the Consti-
tution.
In so far as lesser examples of the President's exercise of the power of
making compacts with foreign countries fall within the normal functions
of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy or the principal diplo-
matic representative of the United States, they can be sustained as illus-
trations of the day-to-day activities of government. In so far as they
touch questions which properly are the subject of treaties, they can some-
times be justified on the ground that the Senate has acquiesced in such
exercise of executive power, finding nothing in the transaction disparaging
to its prerogatives.
Thus, on a few occasions the President has entered into executive agree-
ments which required the appropriation of money or the transfer of
national property by Congress. Here treaty approval has occasionally
been short-circuited by the statement that in any event an act of Congress
would be necessary to make the appropriation or the transfer. It is prob-
ably true that many appropriations have been voted by Congress, which
by implication may be deemed to be approvals of earlier executive agree-
ments, such as the acquisition of Horseshoe Reef in 1850 and the more
recent destroyer-naval bases exchange. In the matter of transferring
several millions of assets from the United States to Panama in 1940, even
36. See BARNETT, INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS WITHOUT THE ADVICE AND CONSENT
OF THE SENATE (1906) 5 HACKWORTH, op. cit. supra note 19 at 390-433; HYDE, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW, CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APs'IFx RY THE UNITED STATES (1922)
§§ 505-509; Catudal, Executive Agreements: A Supplement to the Treaty-Making Pro-
cedure (1941-42) 10 Gru' WASH. L. REV. 653; Levitan, supra note 19, at 376 et seq.;
Moore, supra note 22, at 385-420; Simpson, Legal Aspects of Executive Agreements (1938)
24 IoWA L. REv. 67.
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the Department of State appears to have thought that the transaction
could be justified as an implementation of the 1903 and 1936 Treaties
with Panama.3 7
But it is wrong to infer from these examples that the President
has the unlimited power, as the "sole organ" of communication with
foreign governments, to "conclude" formal agreements, not authorized
by Congress, which can bind the United States. The treaty-making power
is a definite check upon the President's authority to enter into permanent
agreements with foreign countries.
As already observed, the Constitution neither provides a clear defini-
tion of the proper subject matter of treaties nor provides for the existence,
let alone the scope, of executive agreements. Time and circumstances,
however, provide guidance on these questions. We know approximately
what kind of questions have historically been embraced by each form and
what therefore are their proper spheres.
SENATE STAND ON ITS CONSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVES
It is believed that in the few instances where the President has used
his power to make executive agreements in a field important enough to
warrant a treaty, as in the case of the destroyer-naval bases transaction,
explanation can be found in the apparent Senate acquiescence in the par-
ticular assumption of executive power. Thus, the abortive Reciprocity
Agreement with Canada of 1911 apparently encroached upon the primary
jurisdiction over tariffs of the House of Representatives, but the arrange-
ment was left as a "proposal" only, until congressional approval was
obtained. Furthermore, the Senate gave its approval by majority vote,
which was a waiver of its treaty prerogative if that were an issue,3s and, as
seems more important, Congress had previously authorized the President to
make the Agreement.
Horseshoe Reef was acquired in 1850 by simple executive agree-
ment, but the Senate both before and after joined in approving an appro-
37. Professor Herbert W. Briggs states that the Joint Resolution was in reality
based on an uncommunicated executive agreement by e.xchange of notes dated May 18, 1942.
Briggs, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and the Panama Joint Resolution of 1943 (1943)
37 Air. Poi ScL Rnv. 686. The Department of State seems to regard this as an executive
agreement, whereas Panama regards it as a treaty. 6 DEr. OF STATE BULL Xo. 152 (1942)
452. The debates in the Senate of December 3 and 4, 1942, where the submitted joint
resolution was ultimately approved, 40 to 29, 88 ConG. Rc. 92t6-9329 (1942), reveal
exceptionally strong protest against the President's use of the executive agreement to dis-
place the Senate's power in treaty-making. Mr. Briggs ends his comment with the state-
ment: "... unless the devious methods employed to deprive the Senate of its constitutional
authority in the making of treaties are soon abandoned, the nation may be faced with a
Senatorial revolt at precisely the critical time when the United States is called upon to
assume a larger role in the post-war settlement" Briggs, supra, at 691.
38. 5 HAcKworTH, op. cit. supra note 20, at 416-417.
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priation for a lighthouse there-a condition of the cession; thus it is
proper to say the Senate waived its prerogatives.39 In the matter of
joining the International Labor Organization by joint resolution, the
Senate, as was indicated above, gave its approval unanimously. The Root-
Takahira Agreement of 1908 was communicated to the Senate for its in-
formation and received Senate acquiescence. 40 It is more difficult to justify
the 1940 destroyer-naval bases exchange, on legal grounds, but congres.
sional acquiescence may be inferred from the almost unanimously approved
Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941, and from the votes authorizing appro-
priations for the bases.4
In the case of the recent United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agree-
ment, calling for a contribution of $1,350,000,000 by the United States,
a plan was worked out whereby a sub-committee of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee was called into consultation by the State Depart-
ment before the multilateral agreement was concluded. The consent of
the sub-committee to the Agreement was later obtained together with a
corr#nitment to recommend to the Senate a waiver of insistence upon a
treaty.42
That the Senate has on occasion insisted upon a treaty rather than an
executive agreement is indicated by President Theodore Roosevelt's effort
to arrange for financial administration of the affairs of Santo Domingo
by executive agreement. On January 20, 1905, such an agreement was
signed, but its submission to the Senate was withheld. Between 1905 and
1907, when the treaty was eventually adopted, Theodore Roosevelt ad-
ministered the arrangement through an executive agreement, realizing the
precariousness of its life, but considering necessity paramount. This
may be viewed as a inodus vi'cndi, analogous to many others concluded
in the past. In his Autobiography, President Roosevelt stated:
"The Constitution did not explicity give me power to bring about
the necessary agreement with Santo Domingo. But the Constitution
did not forbid my doing what I did. I put th6 agreement into effect,
and I continued its execution for two years before the Senate acted;
and I would have continued it until the end of my term, if necessary,
without any action by Congress. But it was far preferable that there
should be action by Congress, so that we might be proceeding under
a treaty which was the law of the land and not merely by a direction
39. Levitan, supra note 19, at 378.
40. BAmyY, A Dx oxAsic HISTORY OF THE. AtmIucAN Pftorii (1940) 574.
41. For a critical discussion, see Borchard, The Attorney General's Opinion on the
Exchange of Destroyers for Naval Bases (1940) 34 Am. J. INT. L. 690; Briggs, Neglected
Aspects of the Destroyer Deal (1940) 34 Am. J. INT. L. 569. See also Lord Lothian's
advance criticism, reported in 89 Cong. Rec., March 17, 1943, at 2180-81 (19,43), and Pro-
fessor Corvin's letter to the New York Times. N. Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1940, § 4, p. 6, col. 5.
42. CoLERovE, op. cit. supra note 6, at 28-30. Mr. Colegrove calls this the "Senator
Green-Sayre formula" of August 24, 1943.
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of the Chief Executive which would lapse when that particular
Executive left office. I therefore did my best to get the Senate to
ratify what I had done. There was a good deal of difficulty about
it .... 43
If the Senate in some fashion consents explicitly or impliedly to an
executive agreement where the propriety of a mere agreement is doubt-
ful, possibly no objection can be raised except those objections predicated
upon the general deficiencies of executive agreements. It is probably
also true that if the Senate waives its treat), prerogatives long enough in
the face of a continuing Presidential determination to make compacts with
foreign countries by executive agreements, the Senate may, by such de-
fault, lose its constitutional prerogatives altogether. But this would merely
amount to Senate acquiescence in what many students consider an un-
constitutional practice and would not therefore be an effective mode of
general "ratification."
WEAKNESS OF EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT
The proposal to make the executive agreement a general substitute for
the treaty has many objections. That it is an evasion of the Constitution,
characterized as dishonest and dangerous to the entire Constitution and
to law, has been admitted by some of the more ardent proponents of the
only lawful method of change --a constitutional amendment.
Executive agreements have other dangers and weaknesses which in any
case militate against their wide use: First, they permit the President to
involve the country in secret agreements, as in case of the secret clause
attached to the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of 1917," the secret Roosevelt-
43. See CoawIx, TRE PREsDENT: OFFICE AND PowFas (1941) 237; THE goo RGOSE-
vELT, Ax AuToBIOGRAPHY (1913) 551.
44. The Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs suggested that the
two major parties insert in their platforms a plank pledging that the peace treaties to be
concluded after this war be validated by majority vote of both Houses. This, says the
New York Times, is asldng both parties "to pledge themselves to disregard the plain
wording of the Constitution." In suggesting that "treaties" be called "agreements," the
Times says: "This is merely to argue that we can get around the Constitution by con-
spiring with each other to call a spade by another name," and properly adds, that if that
can be done "we can do away with the need for any approval of treaties"; in fact, we can
"interpret" the Constitution away. The Times adds: "There is one honest, straightforv,-ard
method of change," and that is by constitutional amendment. N. Y. Times, April 17, 1944,
p. 22, col. 1. In another editorial, the Times maintained: "This ignoring of a plain con-
stitutional requirement would be a dangerous precedent. It would put in doubt the validity
of treaties and international agreements not ratified in the constitutionally prescribed man-
ner." N. Y. Times, May 22, 1944, p. 18, col. 2. See also CoLonvE, op. cit. r pra note 6,
at 28, 31, 95, 105, 110.
45. This secret clause vas not disclosed until the Agreement was repealed at the
Washington Conference of 1922. Sax. Doc. No. 393, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. (1923) (App. II)
3825. See 2 Fop. R. U. S. Dep't State: THn LA.%siNG P.Pzres (1940) 450.
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Katsura Agreement of 1905 recently disclosed by Mr. Dennett,40 and the
armistice with Italy, the terms of which have not been published. Other
examples of such secret control are the second Panama Agreement of
May 18, 1942, which was left undisclosed for months, and the Roosevelt-
Mackenzie King Defense Agreement of August 18, 1940, only the barest
outlines of which seem to have been published."' Secondly, executive
agreements either bind a) only the administration that made them, as
Theodore Roosevelt and others have thought, or b) are of uncertain
duration. In the third place, they may be terminated unilaterally by any
future President at any time, without incurring the charge of treaty vio-
lation. Fourthly, it is unsafe for the United States dr any foreign country
to enter into such agreements since, if congressionally approved, they
can be congressionally disapproved at any time. In the fifth place, execu-
tive agreements do not have the constitutional dignity and force of a
treaty, since the Constitution makes no mention of them, but specifically
mentions treaties.48 In the sixth place, their conscious use as a substitute
for treaties gives rise to the charge of constitutional "evasion." 40
46. See Dennett, President Roosevelt's Secret Pact With Japan (1924) 21 CuR=uNT
HISTORY 15.
47. See N. Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1940, p. 1, col. 4; N. Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1940, p. 1,
col. 1; 3 DEPT. OF STATE Buur. No. 61 (1940) 154.
48. Every country is charged with knowledge of the obvious parts of its co-contractor's
constitutional law. See Fairman, Competence to Bind the State to an International En-
gagement (1936) 30 Am. J. INT. L. 439.
49. Colegrove states:
"An executive agreement as a substitute for a treaty comes dangerously close
to an evasion of the Constitution. The employment of this method would place
the post-war pacts on a basis that lacks the traditional validity of treay-law. It
would leave an uncertainty in the minds of our allies who would find American
commitments resting on an arrangement which is not expressly defined in the Con-
stitution. COLEGROVE, op. cit. supra, note 6, at 31.
He adds:
"Some doubt exists as to the continuing obligation of executive agreements on
succeeding Presidents. For instance, an exchange of notes, such as the Lansing-
Ishii Agreement of 1917 on Japanese "special interests" in China, has been deemed
morally and politically binding upon the administration that negotiated it, but
not upon its successor. Some executive agreements, therefore, cannot be con-
sidered as a part of the law of the land.... " Id. at 105.
He concludes:
"The use of executive agreements as a substitute for a peace settlement is a
palpable evasion of the fundamental law. The Constitution is clear and un-
ambiguous on the subject of treaties." Id. at 110.
See also Wn.cox, TnE RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS (1935) 231:
"Certain considerations arise, however, which limit their extensive use. The
idea that the agreements defining executive policy bind only the President under
whose direction they are made and may be repudiated by a succeeding admilnis-
tration probably weakens their authority. Furthermore, the agreements made by
the express authorization of Congress 'appear to be dependent for their effective-
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Executive agreements are of limited utility because their life and dura-
bility are exceedingly precarious. They are either predicated upon an
authorizing statute, which may be repealed, or else they are the independent
result of Presidential policy. We have already observed that Theodore
Roosevelt considered them binding only on the administration which signed
them.50 This has been the common view, 1 although its correctness may
depend somewhat on the nature of any particular agreement.
In his cla.ssic book on the treaty-making power, Charles Henry Butler
dismissed the executive agreement as follows:
"It is not, so far as the United States is concerned, a treaty, and
does not become the supreme law of the land. How far it is binding
upon the national conscience is therefore a political and not a legal
question...
"Such protocols and agreement when first made are binding in a
moral sense upon the Executive department of the administration mak-
ing them; they are not laws nor are they contracts which the legisla-
tures of either party are bound to render effectual by legislation,
until after they have assumed legal form by ratification. It is doubt-
ful if they are binding even morally upon any administration other
than that which entered into them." 52
While this was written forty years ago and may not be altogether un-
challengeable, it serves to indicate that one of the leading authorities on
the subject regarded executive agreements as having a status much inferior
to that of treaties. Twenty years later, Justice Sutherland could still
speak of executive agreements as having "moral obligation" only."s Sec-
retary of State Lansing considered that the Lansing-Ishii Agreement,
though involving an important admission of the priority of Japanese
claims in North China, was merely a statement of governmental policy,
revocable at will, and not binding on the United States.4
ness upon the authorizing legislation, and are terminable, both nationally and
internationally, at the discretion of Congress.' It is also evident that if the Presi-
dent ashes to conclude agreements Without the authorization of the Senate or of
Congress, they should be of such a nature that he alone is able to eaecute them."
Secretary of State Gresham, replying to a Brazilian protest against congressional
termination of a tariff agreement made under a prior act, denied that they were treaties.
FoR Rza. U. S. (U. S. Dep't State 1894) 77. He maintained that they could be unilaterally
superseded by Act of Congress.
50. See page 677 supra.
51. See the statement of Senator Taft, 88 COG. Rc. 9276-9273 (1942).
52. See 2 Bumna, THE TREATY-'MAKING POWER OF THE UIiE STATES (1902) 370.
53. See SUTHERI.AND, op. cit. supra note 26, at 120.
54. See Hearings before Committee on Foreign Relations on Treaty of Peace usith,
Germany, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919). President Wilson considered in 1919 that "it
-as not an agreement at all, but an 'understanding'." N. Y. Times, July 11, 1919, p. 1,
col. 5. See President Harding's view that it vras a declaration of policy, 5 HAI{moarn,
op. cit. supra note 20, at 431. The Root-Takahira Agreement of 1903, like the Open Door
Notes of 1900, was also a statement of policy.
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Other recent students have similarly recognized the limitations in use-
fulness inherent in the very nature of executive agreements. Professor
Wright " would limit the power to make executive agreements to matters
within the President's independent power of enforcement, which to Mr.
Levitan "t "appears to be the most acceptable explanation." Speaking of
congressionally delegated power to enter into agreements with foreign
powers, Professor Wright adds that the "arrangement seems to be ter-
minable at discretion of Congress." 57 Professor Arneson concludes that
such agreements bind us as far as national honor is concerned, but do
not become a part of our domestic law. s
Professor Corwin appears to be among the very few who seem to con-
tend that an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty."0 It seems to the
writer that Corwin attributes undue importance to the ruling in United
States v. Pink,6" presently to be discussed, which held that the Litvinoff-
Roosevelt debt assignment of 1933 overruled the previous judicial posi-
tion, based on the "public policy" of the State of New York, as to the
limited effect to be given to Russian confiscatory decrees.
THE IMPACT OF RECENT SUPREME COURT OPINIONS ON EXECUTIVE
AGREEMENTS
Advocates of the proposed constitutional revolution invoke the opinions
of the Supreme Court in the Curtiss-Wright,"' Belmont 02 and Pink 08
cases, as supporting their views on the binding effect of executive agree-
ments. In considering these cases, it should be remembered that the mem-
bers of the Supreme Court often inject into their opinions a certain amount
of unsupportable dictum, especially in dealing with questions outside their
specialties.
In the Curtiss-Wright case, the question involved was whether Congress
could constitutionally delegate to the President the power of imposing an
impartial arms embargo on Bolivia and Paraguay during the Chaco War,
whenever he thought such embargo would contribute to the maintenance
or securing of peace between the two countries. In the District Court,0 4
55. See WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AmRmacAN FOREIGN RE.Aoits (1922) 141, 237,
246, 336.
56. See Levitan, supra note 19, at 394, Citing WRIGHT, DOMESTIC CONTROL (1928) 106.
57. See WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 55, at 233, 236.
58. See Levitan, supra note 19, at 394, quoting ARNEsox, ELEMENTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1928) 328.
59. See CORWIN, op. cit. pra note 6, at 43.
60. 315 U. S. 203 (1942).
61. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304 (1936).
62. United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324 (1937).
63. United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203 (19,12).
64. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 14 F. Supp. 2,30 (S. D. N. Y. 1936).
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Judge Byers found this delegation of power to the President improper on
the ground that it substituted mere presidential opinion for fact-finding.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding the congressional action
perfectly permissible. But the opinion of the Court, written by Mr. Justice
Sutherland, did not stop there; it added that in the matter of "negotiation"
and "inquiry" the President's powers were plenary and beyond the control
of Congress. Justice Sutherland went even further, and delivered a
lengthy essay on federal and Presidential powers, which was utterly un-
necessary to the case at bar and contains enough ambiguities to afford
indefinite sources of argument. He maintained 0' that the federal govern-
ment-and presumably the President as its "organ"-d erived sovereign
and negotiating powers in foreign affairs from sources lying in national
sovereignty and beyond the Constitution, though he was careful to point
out that the Constitution limited the power of the President to bind the
nation. These ebullient remarks, which have misled officials of the De-
partment of State, have been severely criticized, notably by the distinguished
historian Charles A. Beard," as well as other scholars, as not justified by
constitutional or historical sources.
The Belnont and Pink cases involved the question of whether the Lit-
vinoff assignment of Russian-held assets to this country, as a fund for
the payment of American claims against Russia, included the proceeds of
the confiscated private property of Russian citizens in the United States.
An affirmative answer presupposed that Russia had successfully confis-
cated such American-situs property and that the United States courts
were required to give effect to extraterritorial confiscation. Theretofore
the general rule had been in all foreign countries, as well as in the United
States, that such confiscations affected only property located in Russia.
The further question involved was whether Soviet Russia had conveyed or
could convey such property to the United States. The Litvinoff assignment
was an inherent condition of Executive recognition.
The Belmont case arose in 1936 solely on a motion to dismiss, without
proof of New York law or policy, or the rights of creditors or stock-
holders. Instead of emulating the procedure of the two lower courts and
granting the motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court remanded the case for
further proof of New York policy and for examination of individual
claims to the property and the question whether the Fifth Amendment
permitted public confiscation by the Russian government or by executive
65. See also SUTHERLAND, op. cit. supra note 26, at 120 ct seq.
66. See BEARD, THE REPUBLIc (1943) 217-18. In a learned article, Professor Patterson
attacks Justice Sutherland's supposed discovery of the inherent powers of the federal gov-
ernment in internal and external affairs as "(1) contrary to Ainerican history; (2) violative
of our political theory; (3) unconstitutional, and (4) unnecessary, undemccratic, and
dangerous." Patterson, in re the United States -. Curliss-Wrilght Corporation (1914) 22
Tix. L. RE . 286, 297. See also continuation Ibid, 445, and Judge Quarles in 32 G m-. I. J.
375 (1944).
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act of the President. The minority, composed of Justices Stone, Brandeis
and Cardozo, joined only in denying the motion to dismiss, which, it is
submitted, should have been granted.
In the Pink case in 1941, involving title to a fund held by the New York
Superintendent of Insurance after liquidation of the New York branch of
a Russian insurance company, Justice Douglas, over the vigorous dissent
of Justices Stone and Roberts, broadened the application of Justice Suther-
land's dictum in the majority opinion in the Belmont case. lIe held that
Russia had purported to confiscate the American-situs property-which
is denied by competent students of the subject-and that this private prop-
erty has been conveyed to the United States, which is also denied by many
students in the light of the historical facts. Mr. Justice Douglas held
further that the executive agreement, an incident of recognition, prevailed
over New York law and policy, in the same manner as a treaty, and that the
Fifth Amendment did not prevent the United States from thus cutting off
the rights of creditors and stockholders. This opinion, which has been mis-
used by some to sustain the omnipotence of the executive agreement, has
itself been criticized by almost all commentators on the subject."'
CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion has indicated the weakness of the arguments
for changing the present constitutional prescription regarding the con-
sumnation of compacts with foreign nations. While a constitutional
amendment is wholly lawful, it does not appear probable that the Gillette
Resolution for an amendment, which would reduce the vote necessary
for Senate approval of a treaty from two-thirds to a bare majority,",
can even command a majority in the committee so that it can be reported
out. Other proposed amendments of similar import have had the same
experience.
Proponents of a constitutional amendment do not take account of the
new troubles they would encounter if the President did not belong to the
67. See Borchard, Extraterritorial Confiscations (1942) 36 Am. J. INT. L. 275, 282;
Comments (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 848; (1942) 5 DFm'oiT L. Ra,. 130; (1942) 30 Gao. L, J.
663; (1942) 58 L. Q. REv. 451; (1942) 90 U. oF PA. L. REv. 741. Where the issue does
not involve a federal agreement, New York adheres to its view that a foreign confiscation
of New York property is intolerable and will not be enforced. Bollack v. Soeit6 Generale,
263 App. Div. 601, 33 N. Y. S. (2d) 986 (1942). Must we conclude that the foreign
confiscation is recognized only when the United States Government becomes the bene-
ficiary of the spoliation?
68. Compare BLOOm, op. cit. mpra note 9, at 15. Commenting upon the reluctance of the
Senate to propose a constitutional amendment, the New York Times said editorially: "It
may give encouragement to proposals to ignore or by-pass the constitutional requirement
by calling treaties mere 'agreements' or 'executive agreements' or by some similar device."
N. Y. Times, May 22, 1944, p. 18, col. 2. The Times, as observed, deplores "this ignor-
ing of a plain constitutional requirement" as a "dangerous -precedent." Ibid.
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same party as the majority of one or both of the two Houses. They also
fail to realize that it might be easier to get a two-thirds vote of approval
in the Senate,.if a given treaty warrants support, than a majority in a
hostile House or Senate, for the nature of the proposed change is such
that it might make the congressional "veto" more political than it has
been in the past. Furthermore, the assumption that the proposed amend-
ment would be promptly ratified by the states leaves out of account the
effective arguments that will be marshalled in opposition to it.'O Thus
Professor Harry Elmer Barnes in a review of Professor Colgrove's book 7
remarked recently that "the Senate's treaty power is probably the last re-
maining bulwark of our national safety-even more, perhaps, than our
armed forces-and it should be fought for and maintained at all costs." 1
69. See letter by June Barrows, Ratification of Treaties, N. Y. Times, July 1, 1944,
p. 14, col. 6.
70. Colegrove, loc. cit. supra, note 6.
71. The Progressive, March 20, 1944, p. 10, col. 2.
